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DISCUSS 
No. 73-717 Views of the SG 
Antoine v. Washington 
The SG says that the 1891 agreement was ratified by 
Congress and thus became binding on the state by virtue of the 
Supremacy Clause. Therefore, under Puyallup the state may --ndian rights to hunt and fish only on the basis of 
--.....__.-... -------- -
reasonable conservation measures , and there must be a showing 
---- -----that the regulation under which the Indians were convicted is a 
reasonable and necessary conservation measure. "The special rights 
tv' 
of the Indians must be accomodated, so long as consistent with pre-
" 
servation of the game in question." The state has not shown that --conservation requires the resttiction it has imposed here. There-
fore, the convictions are invalid. Probable jurisdiction should 
be noted,or the con~ictions should be reversed. Await discussion--
see what Justice Douglas has to say. A note may be necessary. 
Owens 
~~~ 
V~o-j s ~ 
~7.?- 7- ;;>_:;; 
Preliminary Memo 
January 4, 1974 Conference 





Appe~ from Washington 
uprefue Court 
(RossPllin~ for the Court; 
1Tt i: er' concurring) I 
State - Criminal 
Timely 
1. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed appellants' 
conviction for hunting during closed season and possession of ---deer during closed season. The basic questions presented are 
whether, by virtue of an agree 1ent with certain the 
federal goverrunent reserved hunting rights to tn on 
their former reservation and, if so, whether the State of 
Washington may subject these rights to re8ulation under its 
game laws? .----
- 2 -
2. FACTS: Large areas of Eastern Washington were 
~ 
once inhabited by the Colville Confederated Tribes. In 1872, 
they were placed on the Colville Indian Reservation, and half 
-
of the 5,340 enrolled members of the tribe still live there. 
Appellant Alexander Antoine is an enrolled member of the 
tribe, and although his wife, appellant Irene Antoine, is not 
an enrolled member, she is nonetheless an Indian. In September 
1971, appellants shot and killed a deer during closed season 
in what is now Ferry County, Washington, and was once within 
the boundaries of the original Colville Indian Reservation. 
The land on which appellants were arrested had been ceded 
back to the United States Government by the Colville Confederation 
by an 1891 agreement with the United States. See J.S. Ap ' • F. 
Article 6 of the agreement provided: 
'It is stipulated and agreed that the 
lands to be allotted as aforesaid to said 
Indians and the improvements thereon shall 
not be subject, within the limitations 
prescribed by law, to taxation for any pur-
pose, national, state or municipal; that said 
Indians shall enjoy without let or hindrance 
the right at all times freely to use all 
water power and water courses belonging to 
or connected with the lands to be so allotted, 
and that the );ight_t~_hunJ;, __ <:!JlcLS~i?..l.l ig_com-
rnon with all.otl1er persons on lands not allotted 
to.,. ~~TCi 1Ji4~:·~~s, -~s-·na.fJ~_l1ol.J?~ --i:~.K~~?v.Z?.i-o~ in 
fl11YYZ~~1brH!g~.fL J .s., at 5-6. (Emphasls added.) 
At no time did anyone question that appellants were beneficiaries 
of this agreement. 
3. DECISION OF THE HASHINGTON SUPREME COURT: 0 
a. The SC agreed with appellants that at the time 
of the agreement, the provisions of Article 6 were intended to 
• 
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guarantee the right to hunt on the ceded half of the 
reservation to all Indians on the re~erv~tion and not simply 
the allotment Indianso 
bo Because an Act of Congress at the time of the 
agreement barred making treaties with the Indians, this agreement 
was a contract and not a treaty and must be interpreted accord-,____ .....__ -ingly. But the State of Washington was not a party to the contract 
and the federal government was not authorized to act on its behalf. 
Furthermore, the parties could not have intended that Washington 
be considered a party to the agreement. 
c. The SC rejected appellants' contention that it 
must read into the language promising the continuation of hunting 
and fishing rights a promise that the State would not exercise its 
rights, under the police power, to regulate hunting upon those 
ceded lands which were to become a part of the public domain. 
United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442 (1914) (lands within the 
public domain not subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction are 
subject to state jurisdiction). When Congress passed a law the 
year following the agreement and vacated and restored to the public 
domain a certain portion of the reservation (upon which these game 
law violations occ·urred), it was well aware that these lands would 
be opened for settlement and would come under state control. In 
fact, appellants do not challenge the state's power to regulate 
the taking of game on these lands; they only claim to be exempt 
by virtue of Article 6 of the agreement . 
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The SC was unwilling to embrace appellants' further 
argument that the rights promised under the agreement must 
include immunity from state regulation or else they were 
promised nothing which they would not have had without the 
agreement. The agreement does not expressly or impliedly exempt 
them from regulation. The parties contemplated that the Indians 
would remain subject to regulation; regulation is not ipso facto 
an abridgment; and the agreement meant only that the United 
States, as proprietor of the land, would not abridge the Indians' 
hunting and fishing rights. 
d. The language of Article 6 -- "in common with all 
other persons" -- must be read in the context of the evident 
intent of the government at the time to open the lands to 
settlement. So long as the owners of the land allowed others 
to hunt thereon, the Indians should be able to do likewise. 
Appellants' argument cannot be reconciled with the fact of 
cession of all the Indians' "rights, titles, claim and interest" 
in the lands. Furthermore, nm.;rhere in the laws authorizing the 
allotment of lands, appropriating money for the purchase of the 
Indians' rights, or opening the unallotted land for settlement 
is there any reference to the reservation of hunting and fishing 
rights. 
e. Finally, even though a state may be bound by a 
treaty, a state is not denied the right to enforce against the 
Indians its reasonable regulations for the preservation of fish. 
Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) . 
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Sounding an "Our Federalism" note, the SC concluded by noting 
that its decision is in harmony with preservation of an even 
balance between federal and state powers. Unlike Dick v. 
United States, 208 U.S. 340 (1908) (recognizing Congress' power 
to enter into an agreement with the Indians for a reasonable 
period of time prohibiting the introduction of liquor into the 
Indian country), the hunting of game is not commerce, and here 
there was no clearly articulated intention on the part of 
Congress to exclude the states from exercising their reserved 
powers. 
4. CONTENTIONS: Appellants renew their arguments 
rejected by the Washington SC. In a nutshell, they maintain 
that their Colville hunting rights were preserved by the 1891 
agreement; that federal laws as to Indians are superior to state 
law; and that Indian agreements are to be liberally construed 
to protect the rights of the Indians with all ambiguities re-
solved in the Indians' favor. Appellants further argue that the 
state SC's holding that the federal government could make no 
agreement concerning Indian rights over wildlife because the 
state was not a party to the agreement violates settled law. 
Choate v. Trap£, 224 U.S. 665 (1912); this contravenes Congress' 
constitutional power over Indian affairs under Article I, § 8, 
clause 3. 
5. DISCUSSION: The Washington SC decision strikes me 
as vulnerable on several scores as to the correctness of its ·-----analysis and the sharpness of its focus, but in the long run the 
- 6 -
bottom line may be correct. In Puyallup Tribe I, the Court 
unanimously held that: 
"the manner of fishing, the size of the 
take and the restriction of con~ercial 
fishing, and the like may be regulated 
by the State in the interest of con-
servation, provided the regulation meets 
appropriate standards and does not dis-
criminate against the Indianso ••• The 
overriding police power of the State, 
expressed in nondiscriminatory measures 
for conserving fish resources, is pre-
served." 39 :L U.S., at 398-399 o 
I 
Puyallup Tribe I involved a similar pact with the boilerplate 
"in common with" language, but the 
reasonableness of the conservation 
the Washington SC never undertook. 
- -
decision, the Washington SC appears 
pivotal question is the 
measure, an inquiry which 
Under the rationale of this 
to have departed from this 
mode of analysis and adopted an approach that basically says 
that the State of Washington qua sovereign is not bound by 
anything that the United States Government may have once promised 
all these Indians when it "bought" their lando At least under 
prior authority, this seems to be a potentially dangerous line 
of reasoning and might jeopardize countless agreements and 
treaties with various Indian tribes. It may very well turn out 
that these are reasonable game laws, but no such finding has 
been made. 
Since there is no response, the Court will probably want 
to request one. Moreover, keeping with what seems to be an 
established practice, the Court may also w~nt to call for the 
views of the SG. 
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lfp/ss 10/2/74 
No. 73-717 ANTIONIE v. WASHINGTON 
This is another opaque Indian case here on appeal from 
the Supreme Court of Washington. As I dictate this at home, 
I do not have for reference the Court's decision in the 
cases (391 U.S. 392 and 414 U.S. 44), which 
are relied upon by appellants and the SG but virtually ignored 
by appellee. 
The facts were stipulated (see appellee's brief, p. 7): 
Appellants were convicted for killing a deer out of season 
in Ferry County within the boundaries of the original Colvil! e 
Indian reservation, as established by Executive Order of 1872. 
By agreement between the United Statea and the Colville tribes 
of 1891, the northern half of the Colville reservation was 
ce ded to the United States. The killing of the deer out of 
season occurred in this "northern half" and "outside the 
exterior boundaries of the Colville Indian reservation" as 
it presently exists. It occurred also on "unallotted non-
Indian land". ·k 
As it is difficult (especially in view of my absence of 
learning in Indian law!) to understand the exact sequence 
of various official acts and the consequence thereof, I 
rely primarily on the memorandum of the SG for this aspect 
of the case. The briefs of the parties are in disagreement 
and confusing. 
A presidential commission entered into an agreement 
with the Tribes in 1891 pursuant to which the Tribes 
')'"'Assume the deer was killed on land (e.g. public park or 
reservation) of State of Washington and not on land "allotted" 
to any private owner. 
2. 
"surrendered to the United States" the northern half of the 
reservation. Article VI provided that: 
"The right to hunt and fish in common with all 
other persons on lands not allotted to said 
Indians shall not be taken away or in any wise 
abridged." 
Although it is contemplated that this agreement would 
be approved by Congress it was not approved in 1892 when 
Congress adopted some of its provisions and "vacated and 
restored to the public domain" 1 the northern half of the 
reservation, opening it up to settlement in accordance with 
"the general laws applicable to the disposition of public 
lands in the State of Washington". Article VI with respect 
to hunt~ng and fishing was not included in the Act of 1892. 
But in 1906, Congress in effect purported to ratify the 
1891 agreement. 
The SG, agreeing with appellants, states that by virtue 
of the ratification the agreement "became a law binding on the 
states" (SG's brief, p. 4; Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 
478). State of Washington, while not directly meeting the 
SG's position that ratification made the agreement binding 
on the State of Washington, argues that ratification could 
not be a "treaty" because all treaties were barred after 
1871. 25 U.S.C. 71. The State . argues that Congress had 
no power, absent a treaty, to deprive it of its "police power" 
to enact game co~servation laws. Appellant - apparently with 
the SG's approval-contends that the 1891 agreement is "supreme 
3. 
law" binding on the state and that no game conservation laws 
are applicable to the ceded portion of the Colville reservation. 
The SG, following Puyallup, retreats from the extreme position 
taken by appellant. Rather, the SG acknowledges that the language 
"in common with all other persons" means something. He quotes 
from Puyallup I to the effect that the state, in the interest of 
conservation, may regulate the taking of game provided it meets 
"appropriate standards and does not discriminate against the 
Indians". The SG then says the appellants' conviction should 
be reversed, as the state made no showing here that it had 
enacted standards of any kind. 
I have no view, not having read the cases, as to whether 
the 1891 agreement has the force of a treaty and supercedes the 
state's police power. Unless the provision with respect to 
hunting and fishing was a condition subject to which Washington 
knowingly took the ceded land in 1891, I would think the state's 
police power could not be extinguished by the unilateral act of 
congressional ratification of this agreement in 1906. 
In any event, if this provision is binding upon the State 
of Washington, unless our decisions in the two Puyallup cases* 
require a contrary holding, I would think state game conserva-
tion laws of general applicability are presumptively valid 
and binding upon Indians "in common with all other persons". 
they certainly should be! 
*My recollection is that a Treaty was involved in Puyallup I 
and II. If so, we are back to the question (ignored largely 
by briefs) whether a state's police power can be limited by 
an Act of Congress not of Treaty dignity? 
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Mr. Justice Powell DATE: December 14, 1974 
Ron Carr 
No. 73-717 Antoine and Antoine v. State 
of Washington 
I recommend that you vote to reverse, essentially on 
the basis of the SG's argument. But I doubt that, in doing 
so, you will be giving Mr. and Mrs. Antoine very much reward 
for their effort. 
Despite its very broad language, the Washington Supreme 
Court's opinion had to do essentially with construction of 
the 1891 agreement between the Colville Confederation and 
the United States, ceding back to the United States the 
northern portion of the Colville reservation. The problem 
is the effect of the agreement on Washington's police power 
~- ...... 
over the ceded back portion. If the agreement has the force - -------of treaty or federal law, then its provision that "the right 
to hunt and fish in common with all other persons on lands 
not allotted to said Indians shall not be taken away or 
in anywise abridged" might limit in some measure the State's 
power to apply its conservation laws to Indian hunting in 
the northern half. The Washington court decided, however, 
that the agreement neither constituted a treaty nor did it 
have the force of law through ratification by Congress. 
Hence, Washington's police power over the ceded back portion 
2. 
is plenary, and the above-quoted provision means only that 
(1) Indians remaining in the ceded northern portion will 
continue to have hunting rights in the southern portion; or, 
at most (2) the Indians will have the hunting rights in the 
northern portion common to all persons. Under either inter-
pretation the Antoines were properly convicted. 
The case thus turned on whether the 1891 agreement had n 
the force of law. There is no question that prior to that ------
time the Indians had, under the Executive Order granting them 
the reservation, exclusive hunting rights in the northern 
portion. Nor is there any doubt that, had Congress ratified 
the agreement, it would have had the force of law and the 
State's police power would have been, pro tonto, diminished. 
-E.g., (:hoa;e-v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665. The problem here is 
that Congress did not immediately or expressly ratify the 
agreement; instead, by act of 1892, it restored the lands to 
the public domain, without providing the consideration or 
recognizing the rights provided for in the agreement. The 
State's central argument here is that, in doing this, Congress 
returned the land to the State's plenary police power, and 
that Congress cannot subsequently abrogate this police power 
except by express provision. 
The SG's response to this is, I think, well taken. By 
act of 1906, Congress authorized payments to Indians "[t]o 
carry into effect the [1891] agreement •. II In the same 
3. 
year, in an act appropriating money for such payments, Congress 
referred to the Authorization Act as "ratifying the agreement 
ceding said land to the United States •... " The SG argues 
that this ratification gives the 1891 agreement the force of 
law, binding on the State under the Supremacy Clause. Two 
canons of construction are here in conflict: (1) that limita-
tions on state police power are to be narrowly construed; (2) 
thattreaties and agreements with Indians are to be construed 
in favor of the subject people, and congressional enactments 
for the benefit of Indians are to be liberally construed in 
light of Congress's plenary power to protect Indians wherever 
located. E.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236. 
I think both canons can be satisfied by adopting the 
approach taken in 
~~ PuyalluE Tribe v. 
~ 
Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, and 
Dept. of Game, 391 U.S. 392. Both cases 
dealt with treaties guaranteeing Indians "the right of taking 
f ish, at all usual and accustomed •.. stations, ... in 
connnon with all citizens." The Court held that while the 
treaties prevented the State from conditioning the Indians' 
right to fish on their obtaining a license, it did not 
affect "[t]he overriding police power of the State, expressed 
in nondiscriminatory measures for conserving fish resources 
II The language here - that the Indians' hun~ing rights 
"shall not be . in anywise abridged" - is, perhaps, a 
bit harder to get around than the language in Tulee and 
4. 
Puyallup, but not much. The language can be read as meaning 
that the Indians may not be excluded from hunting, forced to 
pay for the right, or in any way subjected to discriminatory 
regulation. But at the same time, the language was not meant 
to impinge on the State's police power to regulate the time 
~-----------------------------
and manner of exercising those rights, if the regulations are 
reasonably necessary and appropriate for the conservation of 
game and therefore of benefit to Indians and non-Indians 
alike. 
I would hold that the 1891 agreement has the force of 
law, and this would require reversal since the State did not 
establish that its regulation was reasonably necessary and -appropriate to conservation. 
R. C. 
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SUPREME COURT Olf THE UNITED STATES circulated: ~~~.., i _ _ 
No. 73-717 
Alexander J. Antoine et ux., I 0 . . f h S Appellants, n Appeal rom t e u-
preme Court of Wash-
v. . t mg on. 
State of Washington, 
[January - , 1975] 
MR. JusTICE BRENl'fAN delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The appellants, husband and wife, a.re Indians.1 They 
were convicted in the Superior Court of the State of 
·washington of the offenses of hunting and possession of 
deer during closed season in violation of RCW 77.16.020 
and RCW 77.16.030.2 The offenses occurred on unal-
:t. The appellant husband i~> an enrolled member of the Con-
federated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation. Appellant wife 
is a. Canadian Indian and is not enrolied in the United States. The 
State of Washington did not however contest before the state courts-
that both appellants are entitled to the rights of members of the 
Colville Tribes on the property in question. The State Supreme 
Conrt stated, " .. . it is not questioned that [the husband] and his 
wife are beneficiaries of the t1greement .. . . " 82 Wn. 2d 440, 511 
P. 2d 1351 (1973) . Appellee state conceded at. oral argument in 
this Court that reversal of the husband's conviction requires re-
versal of the wife's conviction. Tr. p. 22. 
Tribes that formed the Confederated Tribes include the Colville, 
Columbia, San Poi!, Okanogan, Nez Perce, Lake, Spokane and 
Coeur d' Alene. 
2 The :Uieged offenses occurred on September 11, 1971, in Ferry-
County on unallotted non-Indian land within the ceded northern haH 
of the original reservatwn. 
RCW 77.16 .. 020 provides in pertinent part~ 
Rec irculated: __ --- --
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ANTOINE v. WASHINGTON 
lotted non-Indian land in what was once the north half 
of the Colville Indian Reservation.3 The Colville Con-
federated Tribes ceded to the United States that northern 
half under a congressionally ratified and adopted Agree-
ment dated May 19, 1891. Article 6 of that ratified 
Agreement provided expressly that "the right to hunt 
and fish in common with all other persons on lands not 
allotted to said Indians shall not be taken away or in 
anywise abridged.4 Appellants' defense was that con-
"It :;hall be unlawful for any person to hunt ... game animals ... 
during the respective closed seasons therefor. 
' 
"Any person who hunts ... deer in violation of this section is 
guilty of a gross misdemeanor .... " 
RCW 77.16.030 provides in pertinent part: 
''It shall be lmlawful for any person to have in his possession ... 
any ... game animal ... during the closed season . .. 
"Any prrson who has on hi~ po:;session . . any . . deer . . . in 
violation of the foregomg portion of this section is guilty of a gross 
misdemeanor .... " 
3 The original re~ervation was over 3 million acres "bound on the 
eal:!t and south by the Columbm Rivrr, on the west by the Okanogan 
R1ver. and on the north by thP British possessions." Executive 
Order of July 2, 1872, 1 Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 
916 (2d ed. 1904); l:!ee also Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U. S. 
351, 354 (1962) . 
4 Article 6 providrs in full: 
"It i:; stipulated and agreed that the lands to be allotted as afore-
~aid to said Indians and the improvements thereon shall not be sub-
ject, w1thin the limitations prescribed by law, to taxation for any pur-
pose, national, state or municipal; that said Indian~ shall enjoy 
without let or hmdrance the right at all times freely to use all water 
power and water courses belonging to or connected with the lands to 
bE> t:.O allotted, and that the right to hunt and fish in common with aiJ 
other personK on lands uot allotted to said Indians shall not be taken 
away or in anywise abridged." 
The ~tatus of the southem half of the Colville Reservation was 
cons~derecl in Seymour v. Superintendent, supra, n. 3 At ISsue in 
'73-:"!17 - OPINION 
ANTOINE v. WASHINGTON 3 
·gressional approval of Art. 6 preserved by federal sta.tute 
the exclusive, absolute and unrestricted rights to hunt 
and fish that had been part of the Indians larger rights 
in the ceded portion of the reservation, thus limiting 
·governmental regula.tion of the rights to federal regula-
tion and precluding application by the State of Washing-
ton of RCW 77.16.020 and RCW 77.16:030 to them. 
·The Supreme Court of Washington held that the ·superior 
Court had properly rejected this defense and affirmed the 
convictions, 82 Wn. 2d 440, 511 P. 2d 1351 (1973). We 
noted probable jurisdiction, 417 U. ·s. 966 (1'974). We 
reverse. 
I 
President Grant established the origina1 Colville In-
dian Reservation by Executive Order of July 2, 1872. 
Washington became a State in 1889, 26 Stat. 10, and the 
next year, by the Act of August 19, 1890, 26 Stat. 355, 
Congress created the Commission that negotiated the 
1891 Agreement. 5 By its terms, the Tribes ceded the 
northern half of the reservation in return for benefits 
this ca.se are the residual rights to hunt and fish on the northern 
half preserved by the above Art. 6. 
6 The Colville Indian Cornmis~ion was composed of Chairman 
Fullerton, and Commissioners Durfur and P11.yne. The Commission 
first met. on May 7, 1891, with representatives of the Confederated 
Tribes at Nespelem, Washingto!l, on the reservation, and according 
to the minutes of that meeting thf' immediate topic of discussion was 
"a ~ale of a part of Reservation .. .. " During succeeding days, Ko-
Mo-Del-Kiah, Chief of the San Poi!, strongly opposed the sale of 
any part of the reservation, but Antoine, Chief of the Okanogan 
and great grandfather of appellant Alexander Antoine, Moses, Chief 
of the Columbia, and .Joseph, Chief of the Nez Perce, favored the 
proposed 1R91 Agreement as fair. At a later meeting on May 23 at 
Marcus on tlw reservation, Barnaby, Chirf of the Colville, and the· 
Chief of the Lake agreed to the proposed sale. Minutes of Colville 
Ind1an Commission Concerning Negotiation for the 1891 Agreement 
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which included the stipulations of Art. 6 and the promise 
of the UnHed States to pay $1,500,000 in five install .. 
ments. The Agreement was to become effective, how-
ever, only "from and after its approv~l by Congress." 
Congressional approval was given in a series of statutes. 
The first statute was the Act of July 1, 189Z, 27 Stat. 62, 
which "vacated l:j,nd restored [the tract] to the public 
domain ... ," and "open [ ed] ... [it] ... to settle-
merit .... " The second statut.e came 14 years later, the 
Act of June 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 325, 337-338. That statute 
in terms "carr[ied] into effect the Agreement," and 
authorized the appropriation of the $1,500,000. Pay-
ment of the $1,500,000 was effected by five subsequent 
enactments from 1907 t.o 1911, each of which appropri-
ated $300,000 and recited that it was part payment "to 
the Indians on the Colville Reservation, Washington, for 
the cession of land opened to settlement by the Act of 
July first, eighteen hundred and ninety-two ... being a 
part of the full sum set aside and held in the Treasury 
of the United States in payment for s&id land under the 
terms of the Aet of June first, nineteen hundred and six, 
ratifying the agreement ceding said la.nd to the United 
States under date of May ninth, eighteen hundred and 
ninety-one .... " (Emphasis supplied.) 34 Stat. 1015, 
1050-1051 (1907); 35 Stat. 70, 96 (1908); 35 Stat. 781, 
813 (Hl09); 36 Stat. 269, 286 (1910); 36 Stat. 1058, 1075 
(1911).6 
6 The delay in approval was occasioned by the initial reluctance 
of the House to ratify the Agreement without certain changes, 23 
Cong. Rec. 3840, and by doubts raised in the Senate whether the 
Indian:> had title to the reservation, since it was created by Executive 
Order. See S. Hep. No. 664, 52d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2. The 
Interior Department reported ~orne years later that the doubts were 
unfounded. S. Rep. No. 2651, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., 137, 139. A 
House b1ll passed in 1891 replaced the $1,500,000 lump sum with 
a payment of $1.25 per acre, to be paid to the credit of the Indians 
~IS the land would be operwd for homesteadipg. The Senate dis--
., . 
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II 
Although admitted to statehood two years earlier, the 
State of Washington was not a pa.rt.y to the 1891 Agreew 
ment. The opinion of the State Supreme Court relies 
upon that fact to attempt 11 distinction for purposes of 
the Supremacy Clause 7 between the binding result upon 
agreed, however, and passed the Senate Bill that became the Act of 
July 1, 1892. That Act n1akes no mention either of the considera-
tion to be paid, or of the hunting and fishing rights preserved. 
Many protests were registered that Congress had failed to live up 
to the terms of the Agreement. These included protests from the 
Department of the Interior, S. Rep. No. 2561, 59th Cong., 1st Bess., 
137, 139, and from Chairman Fullerton, who had become Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Washington. In a letter, S. Rep. 
No. 2561, supra, p. 40, the Chief Justice said: 
"It may be that my relations to this transaction have somewhat 
warped my judgment, but when I recall the impassioned appeals 
made by some of the aged memb~rs of these remnant bands, calling 
upon their people and upon the heads of the t.ribes not to sign away 
their lands, even though the compensation offered was ample, on 
the ground that it was their last heritage and their last tie on 
earth, I cannot help a feeling of bitterness when I remember that 
the Government, whom we represented to them as being just and 
honorable, took away their land without even the solace of 
compensation." 
These protests and many others finally bore fruit and resulted in 
Congress' enactment of the Act of June 21, 1906, and the fiV& sub-
sequent installment acts. The Colville retained some 16 lawyers 
practicing in the States of Washington, Pennsyvlania, and Georgia, 
and the Distnct of Columbia, who recovered judgments for their 
services in the Court of Claims. Butler and Vale v. United States, 
43 Ct.. Cl. 497 (1908). 
'1 Article Vl, cl. 2, of l he Constitution, the Supremacy Clause, 
provide~:;· 
''This Con~titution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
he made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges 111 every State ;;hall beJ 
bonnd thereby, any Thing m the Constitution or L!IWS of any Stat~ 
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the State of ratification of a cqntract by treaty effecteq 
by concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, Art. II, § 2, 
cl. 2, and the binding result of ratification of a contract 
effected by legislation passed by the House and the 
Senate. The opinion states that "once ratified, a treaty 
becomes the supreme law of the land," but the ratified 
1891 Agreement was a mere contract enforceable "only 
against those party to it," and "not a treaty ... [and] ..• 
not the supreme law of the land." 82 Wn. 2d 444, 511 
P . 2d 1354. The grounds for this attempted distinction 
do not clearly emerge from the 6pinion. The opinion 
states, however, "[tlhe statutes enacted by Congress in 
implementation of this [1891] agreement ... are the 
supreme law if they are within the power of Congress to 
enact ... ,, 82 Wn. 2d 451, 51'1 P. 2d 1358. In the 
context of the discussion in the opinion we take this to 
mean that the Congress is not constitutionally em~ 
powered to inhibit a State's exercise of its police power 
by legislation ratifying a contract between the Executive 
Branch and an Indian tribe to which the State is not a 
party. The fallacy in that proposition is that a legislated 
ratification of an agreement between the Executive 
Brs.nch and an Indian tribe is a "Law of the United 
States made in Pursuance'' of the Constitution and, there-
fore, like "all Treaties made/' is made binding upon 
affected States by the Supremacy Clause. 
The opinion seems to find support for the attempted 
distinction in the fact that the Executive Branch was 
not authorized to contract by treaty with Indian tribes 
in 1891. 82 Wn. 2d 444, 511 P. 2d 1354. Twenty years 
earlier, in 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566, Congress had abrogated 
the contract by treaty method of dealing with Indian 
tribes.M The Act of 1871 resulted from the opposition 
3 The Act of March 3, 1871, 16 Stat . 544, 566, 25 U. S. C. § 7t 
lJrovid(:'d . 
"No lnclum natwn or trihe within the territory of the United! 
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of the House of Representatives to its practical exclusion 
from any policy role in Indian affairs. .For nearly a 
century the Executive Branch made treaty arrangements 
with the Indians "by and with the Advice and Consent 
of the Senate," Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Although the House 
ttppropriated money to carry out these treaties, it had no 
voice in the development of substantive Indian policy 
reflected in them. House resentment first resulted in 
legislation in 1867 repealing "all laws allowing the Presi-
dent, the Secretary of the Interior, or the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs to enter into treaties with any Indian 
tribes," Act of March 28, 1867, 15 Stat. 7, 9, but this was 
repealed a few months later, Act of July 20, 1867, 15 Stat. 
18. There were further unsuccessful Hotlse attempts to 
enter the field of federal Indian policy, and ultimately 
the House refused to grant funds to carry out new 
treaties. United States Department of the Interior, 
Federal Indian Law, 1958, at 211. Finally, the Senate 
capitulated and joined the House in passage of the 1871 
Act as a rider to the Indian Appropriation Act of 1871. 
Federal Indian Law, supra, at 138.9 
States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, 
tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by 
treaty; but no obligation of any treaty lawfully made and ratified 
w1th such lndian nation or tribe prwr to March third, eighteen hun-
dred ~nd seventy-one, l:ihall be hereby mvalidated or impaired." 
a Formrr Commissioner of Indian Affair~ Walker summa.rized the 
f'trugglr as fotlows : 
"In 1871, how<'ver, tlJP insolence of conscious l:itrength, and the 
growing Jealoul:iy of the Honse of Representatives towardl:i the prP-
rogative-arrogated by the Senate-of determming, in connection 
with the execuhv<". all qnrstions of Indian right and title, and of 
tommittmg the Umted Stair, incidentally to pecuniary obligation8 
limited only by ns own ch;;cretion, for which tho House should be 
hound to make provision without inquiry, led to the adoption , after 
seveml severe parliamentar) struggles of the declaration . .. that 
hereafter 'no India11 nation or tribe within the territory of thf• 
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This abrogation of the contract by treaty method 
meant uo more than that after 1871 relations with 
Indians would be governed by Acts of Congress rather 
than by treaty. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94 (1884); 
In re Heff, 197 U. S. 488 (1905 ). But abrogation of the 
contract by treaty method in no way affected Congress' 
power to legislate on problems of Indians, including legis-
lating the ratification of contracts of the Executive 
Branch with Indian tribes to which affected States were 
not parties. Several decisions of this Court settled that 
proposition. In Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665 (1912), 
the Court held that tax exemptions contained in an 1897 
agreement ratified by Congress between the United 
States and Indian tribes a.s part of a cession of Indian 
lands were enforceable against the State of Oklahoma, 
which was not a party to the agreement. In Perrin v. 
Un£ted States, 232 U. S. 78 (1914), the Court enforced 
a clause of an agreement ratified by Act of Congress that 
no intoxicating liquor should be sold on land in South Da~ 
kota ceded and relinquished to the United States, fl,lthough 
So,uth Dakota was not a party to the agreement. The 
Court expressly rejected the contention that the power 
to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors upon all ceded 
lands rested exclusively in the State. Rather, because 
Congress was empowered, when securing the cession of 
part of an Indian reservation withi11 a State, to prohibit 
the sale of intoxicants upon the ceded lands, "it follows 
that the State possesses no exclusive control over the 
subject and that the congressional prohibition. is su-
pr·eme." 232 U. S., at 483. See also Dick v. United 
States, 208 U.S. 340 (1908). These decisions sustained 
the ratified agreements as the exercise by Congress of 
its "plenary power ... to deal with the special problems 
nation, tribe, or power, with whom the UnitPd States may contract 
by treaty.'" Federal Indian Law, 1:rupra, at 211-212, citing Walker" 
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of Indians [that] is drawn both explicitly and implicitly 
from the Constitution itself. Article I, , § 8, 'cl. 3, pro-
vides Congress with the power to regulate commerce .. , 
with the Indian Tribes and thus, to this extent, singles 
Indians out as a proper subject for separate legislation." 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551-552 (1974); see 
also Morton v. RU?:z, 415 U. S. 199, 236 (1974). 
Once ratified by Act of Congress, the provisions of the 
agreements become law, and like treaties, are the supreme 
law of the land. In the absence of any contract between 
the Executive Branch and the Colville Confederated 
Tribes, Congress could constitutionally have .terminated 
the northern half of the Colville Indian Reservation on 
the same terms and conditions that ultimately appeared 
in the 1891 agreement. Maatz v. Arnett, 412 b. S. 481 
(1973). The decisions in Choate, Perrin, and Dick, 
supra, settle that Congress was also constitutionally em-
powered to do so by legislation ratifying the 1891 agree-
ment. The legislative ratification constituted the pro-
visions of the 1891 Agreement, incluqing Art. 6, "Laws 
of the United States ... in Pursuance" of the Constitu-
tion, and the supreme law of the land, just as a contract 
by treaty to the same effect, concurred in by the Senate, 
would have been a treaty binding upon the State. "Con-
gress has power to regulate commerce with the Indian 
tribes, and such power is superior and paramount to the 
authority of any State within whose limits are Indian 
tribes." Dick v. United States, supra, 208 U. S., at 353.w 
l() WRC 37.12.060, which assumes limited jurisdiction over Indians, 
expressly provides that the law shall not deprive any Indian of 
righi s secured by agreement. 
"Nothing in this chapter . . shall deprive any Indian or any Indian 
tnbe, band, community of any right , privilege, or immunity afforded 
under federal treaty, agreement, statute, or Executive Order with 
rcsp('ct to Indian land grants, hunting trapping, or fishing or the 
C()ntrol, licensing, or regulation thereof." (Emphasis addedo) 
r 
" I ,, 
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III 
The opuuon of the State Supreme Court also holds 
that in any event the implementing statutes cannot be 
construed to render RCW 77.16.020 and RCW 77.16.030 
inapplicable to Indian beneficiaries of the Agreement 
since the implementing statutes "make no reference to 
the provision [Article 6] relied upon by the appellants." 
82 Wn. 2d 451, 511 P. 2d 1358. The opin~on reasons, 
"if it was thought that state regulation but not federal 
regulation would constitute an abridgement, an express 
provision to that effect should have been inserted, but 
only after the consent of the state had been sought and 
obtained." 82 Wn. 2d 448, 511 P. 2d 1357. This 
reasoning is fatally flawed. The proper inquiry is not 
whether the State was or should have been a consenting 
party to the 1891 Agreement, but whether appellants 
acquired federally guaranteed rights by congr~ssional 
ratification of the Agreement. Plainly appellants ac-
quire such rights. Congress exercised its pleanry con-
stitutional powers to legislate those federally protected 
rights into law in enacting the implementing statutes 
that ratified the Agreement. State qualification of the 
rights is therefore precluded by force of the Supremacy 
Clause, and neither an express provision precluding state 
qualification nor the consent of the State was required. 
On the contrary, if Congress had meant to subject to 
state regulation the preserved rights to hunt and fishr 
this Court would require that such intent explicitly 
appear on the face of the statutes or in their legislative 
history. "A congressional determination to terminate: { 
[a reservation] must be expressed on the face of the Act 
or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legis-
lative history." Maatz v. Arnett, supra, 412 U. S., at; 
505. Since the Colville Indians rights to hunt and fish 
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are part of their larger rights in that ceded half, see 
Menominee Tribe v. United States1 391 U.S. 404 (1968)/1 
we hold that a congressional determination to subject 
thos~ghts to qualification by state regulation must 
similarly "be expressed on the face of the statutes or be 
clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative 
history." 
But no congressional purpose to subject the preserved r 
rights to such state regulation is to be found in 
either the implementing acts or their legislative history. 
Rather, the implementing statutes unqualifiedly, '~car-
r [ied] into effect" and "ratif [ied]" the explicit and 
unqualified provision of Art. 6 that "the r~ght to hunt 
and fish . shall not be taken away or in anywise 
abridged." 
IV 
FinaJly, the opinion of the State Supreme Court con-
strues Art. 6 as merely a promise by the United States 
that so long as it retained any ceded land and allowed 
others to hunt thereon, Indians would be allowed also to 
hunt there. 82 Wn., at 449-450, 511 P. 2d, at 1357-1358. 
But the provision of Art. 6 that the preserved rights are 
not exclusive and are to be enjoyed "in common with all 
other persons," does not support that interpretation or 
affect the Supremacy Clause's preclusion of qualifying 
u Even without an express provision preserving hunting and fish-
ing rights, Menominee stated that those rights are "part of the larger 
rights possf'Ssed by the Indians in the lands used and occupied by 
them," Federal Indian Law, supra, at 497, citing Op. Act. Sol. M. 
28107, and survive the termination of the reservation. There is 
no merit in the State's argument that the termination of the northern 
half of the Reservation by the 1.892 Act without mention of Art. 6 
or any other specific preservation of hunting and fishing rights left 
the State free to regulate the Indians' exercise of those rights. But 
in any event the 1892 Act was only one of the series of statutr'8 
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state regulation. Non-Indians are, of course, not bene-
ficiaries of the preserved rights and the State remains 
wholly free to prohibit or regulate non-Indian hunting 
and fishing. The ratifying legislation must be construed 
to exempt the Indians' preserved rights from like state 
regulation, however, else Congress preserved nothing 
which the Indians would not have had without that legis-
lation. For it is impermissible in the absence of explicit 
congressional expression, to construe the implementing 
acts as "an impotent outcome to negotiations and a con-
vention, which seemed to promise more and give the word 
of the nation for more." United States v. Winans, 198 
U. S. 371, 380 (1905); Puyallup Tribe v. Department of 
Game (Puyallup !), 391 U. S. 392, 397-398 (1968). 
·Winans involved a treaty that reserved to the Indians 
in the area ceded to the United States "the right of taking 
fish at all usual and accustomed pll:\-ces, in common with 
citizens of the Territory." 198 U. S., supra, at 378. 
Puyallup considered a provision that "[t]he right of tak-
ing fish , at all usual a.nd accustomed grounds and stations, 
.is further secured to said Indians, in common with all 
citizens of the Territory .. . . " 391 U. S., supra, at 395. 
The Court held that rights so preserved "may, of course, 
not be qualified by the State .... " 391 U. S., supra, 
at ~98; 198 U. S., supra, at 384. Article 6 presents an 
even stronger case since Congress' ratification of it in-
cluded the flat prohibition that the right "shall not be 
taken away or in anywise abridged." 
The canon of construction that this Court has applied 
over a century is that the wording of treaties and agree-
ments with the Indians are not to be construed to their 
prejudice. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U. S. (6 Pet.) 515 
(1832). See also The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)' 
737, 760 ( 1866) ; United States v. Kaga.ma, 118 U. S. 375 
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28 (1886); Umted States v. Winans, 198 U. S. 371, 380-
381 (1905); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912); 
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U. S. 404, 406 n. 
2 (1968). That canon furthers discharge of "the dis-
tinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Govern-
ment in its dealing with these dependent and sometimes 
exploited people," Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 
U. S. 286, 296 (1942); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U. S., supra, 
at 236. 'V'e have no reason in this case, however, to in-
voke that canon of construction. The clarity and com- l 
plete absence of ambiguity in the wording of Art. 6 makes 
resort to the canon wholly unnecessary. 
v 
In Puyallup Tribe v. United States, supra, 391 U. S., 
at 398, we held that although, these rights "may ... not 
be qualified by the State, ... the manner of fishing [and 
hunting], the size of the take, the restriction of commer-
cial fishing [and hunting] and the like may be regulated 
by the State in the interest of conservation, provided the 
regulation meets appropriate standards and does not 
discriminate against the Indians." 391 U. S., supra, at 
398. The "appropriate standards" requirement means 
that the State must demonstrate that its regulation is a 
re::asonable and necessary conservation measure, Depart-
ment of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U. S. 44 (1973); 
Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681,684 (1942), and that 
its application to the Indians is necessary in the interest 
of conservation. 
The United States as amicus curiae, invites the Court 
to announce that state restrictions "cannot abridge the 
Indians' federally protected rights without [the State] 
demonstrating a compelling need'' in the interest of con-
servation. Brief of the United States as amicus curiae, 
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this question. The State of Washington has not argued, 
let alone esta~lished, that applying the ban on out-of-
season hunting of deer by the Indians on the land in 
question is in any way necessary or even useful for the 
conservation of deer. See Hunt v. United States, 278 
U.S. 96 (1928).12 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of 
Washington sustaining appellants' convictions is re-
versed and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
12 Appellants apparently claim no right to hunt on fenced private 
property. The State Supreme Court stated: 
"Counsel . .. conceded in oral argument that the present owners; 
of land in the northern half of the reservation have the right ta 
fence their land and exclude hunters. Nevertheless they maintain 
t,hat state regulation of the right to hlllnt is an abridgement of that 
right , , . :•· 82 Wn. 2d 448, 5U P, 2.d 13;5!1. 
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Re: No. 73-717 --Alexander J. Antoine et ux. v. 
State of Washington 
Dear Bill: 
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$;\ 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
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. Dear Bill: '* ~·· ;·· ·ti¥. 
I read your fine opinion over the weekend, 
and will be happy to join you. The one concem which 
I have relates to hunting on private land. Your note 
12 (p. 14) comes fairly close to the point. I would 
prefer, however, to put up a "smoke signal" that will 
make our message to the "Injuns" somewhat sharper. 
For example, perhaps an additiunsl paragraph in the 
footnote along the. followi'L1g lines would be helpful: 
"A claim of entitlement to hunt on 
fenced or posted private land without prior 
permission of the owner would raise serious 
questions not presented in this case." 
, . . .. 
I ·'· 
Indeed, I would prefer to say categorically that . 
the reserved right to hunt cannot be construed as 
conferring the hunting privilege except on publicly ,. 
owned land or private land with prior permission of the ·r; 
owner. 
Without having checked the transcript of oral 
argument, my recollection is that the offense in this 
case occurred on private land, although no issue was 
made of this. 
Sincerely, 















JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.$5u.prtntt <!Jttttrt af t~t ~ttittb ~htfrg 
'J!iagJrhtgt~ ~. <!f. 2ll~'1j 
January 20, 1975 
Re: No. 73-717 -- Antoine v. State of Washington 
Dear Bill: 
In due course I will circulate a dissent in the 
above case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 




SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
c· 
No. 73-717 
Alexander J. Antoine et ux., 
Appellants, 
v. 
State of Washington, 
On Appeal from the Su-
preme Court of Wash-
ington, 
[January -, 1975] 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The appellants, husband and wife, a.re Indians.1 They 
were convicted in the Superior Court of the State of 
Washington of the offenses of hunting and possession of 
deer during closed season in violation of RCW 77.16.020 
and RCW 77.16.030.2 The offenses occurred on unal-
1 The appellant husband is an enrolled member of the Con-
federated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation. Appellant wife 
is a Canadian Indian and is not enrolled in the United States. The 
State of Washington did not however contest before the state courts 
that both appellants are entitled to the rights of members of the 
Colville Tribes on the propert.y in question. The State Supreme 
Court stated, " . . . it is not questioned that [the husband] and his 
wife are beneficiaries of the agreement . .. . " 82 Wn. 2d 440, 511 
P. 2d 1351 (1973). Appellee state conceded at oral argument in 
this Court that reversal of the husband's conviction requires re-
versal of the wife's conviction. Tr. p. 22. 
Tribes that formed the Confederated Tribes include the Colville, 
Columbia, San Poil, Okanogan, Nez Perce, Lake, Spokane and 
Coeur d' Alene. 
2 The alleged offenses occurred on September 11, 1971, in :Ferry 
County on unallotted non-Indian land within the ceded northern half 
of the original reservation. 
RCW 77.16.020 provides in pertinent part: 
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2 ANTOINE v. WASHINGTON 
lotted non-Indian land in what was once the north half 
of the Colville Indian Reservation.3 The Colville Con-
federated Tribes ceded to the United States that northern 
half under a congressionally ratified and adopted Agree-
ment dated May 19, 1891. Article 6 of that ratified 
Agreement provided expressly that "the right to hunt 
and fish in common with all other persons on lands not 
allotted to said Indians shall not be taken away or in 
anywise abridged." 4 Appellants' defense was that con-
"It shall be unlawful for any person to hunt ... game animals ... 
during the respective closed seasons therefor. 
"Any person who hunts ... deer in violation of this section ie 
guilty of a gross misdemeanor .... " 
RCW 77.16.030 provides in pertinent part: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person to have in his possession ... 
any ... game animal ... during the closed season ... 
"Any person who has on hil' possession . . . any . . . deer ... in 
violation of the foregoing portion of this section is guilty of a gross 
misdemeanor ... . " 
8 The original reservation was over 3 million acres "bound on the 
east and south by the Columbia River, on the west by the Okanogan 
River, and on the north by the British possessions." Executive 
Order of July 2, 1872, 1 Kappler, Indian Affair~, Laws and Treaties 
916 (2d ed. 1904); see also Seymour v. Supert'ntendent, 368 U. S. 
351, 354 (1962) . 
4 Article 6 provides in full : 
"It is stipulated and agreed that the land~ to be allotted as afore-
said to said Indians and the improvements thereon shall not be sub-
ject, within the limitations prescribed by law, to taxation for any pur-
pose, national, state or municipal; that said Indians shall enjoy 
without let or hindrance the right at all times freely to use all water 
power and water courses belongmg to or connected with the lands to 
be so allotted, and that the right to hunt :md fish in common with all 
other persons on lands not allotted to said Indians shall not be taken 
.away or in anywise abridged." 
The status of the southern half of the Colville Reservation was 
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gressional approval of Art. 6 preserved by federal statute 
the exclusive, absolute and unrestricted rights to hunt 
and fish that had been part of the Indians larger rights 
in the ceded portion of the reservation, thus limiting 
governmental regulation of the rights to federal regula-
tion and precluding application by the State of Washing-
ton of RCW 77.16.020 and RCW 77.16.030 to them. 
The Supreme Court of Washington held that the Superior 
Court had properly rejected this defense and affirmed the 
convictions, 82 Wn. 2d 440, 511 P. 2d 1351 (1973). We 
noted probable jurisdiction, 417 U. S. 966 (1974). We 
reverse. 
I 
President Grant established the original Colville In-
dian Reservation by Executive Order of July 2, 1872. 
Washington became a State in 1889, 26 Stat. 10, and the 
next year, by the Act of August 19, 1890, 26 Stat. 355, 
Congress created the Commission that negotiated the 
1891 Agreement.5 By its terms, the Tribes ceded the 
northern half of the reservation in return for benefits 
this case are the residual rights to hunt and fish on the northern 
half preserved by the above Art. 6. 
5 The Colville Indian Commis~ion was composed of Chairman 
Fullerton, and Commissioners Durfur and Payne. The Commission 
first met on May 7, 1891, with representatives of the Confederated 
Tribes at Nespelem, Washington, on the reservation, and according 
to the minutes of that meeting the immediate topic of discussion was 
"a sale of a patt of Reservation .... " During succeeding days, Ko-
Mo-Del-Kiah, Chief of the San Poil, stronglv opposed the sale of 
any part of the rest>rvation, but Antoine, Chief of the Okanog~n 
and great grandfather of appellant Alexander Antoine, Moses, Chief 
of the Columbia, and Joseph, Chief of the Nez Perce, favored the 
proposed 1R91 Agreement as f11ir. At a later meeting on May 23 at 
Marcus on the reservation, Barnaby, Chief of the Colville, and the 
Chief of the Lake agreed to the proposed sale. Minutes of Colville 
Indian Commission Concerning Negotiation for the 1891 Agreement 
of Sale, National Archives Document 21167. 
.. . .. 
,, . .. 
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which included the stipulations of Art. 6 and the promise 
of the United States to pay $1,500,000 in five install-
ments. The Agreement was to become effective, how· 
ever, only "from and after its approval by Congress." 
Congressional approval was given in a series of statutes. 
The first statute was the Act of July 1, 1892, 27 Stat. 62, 
which "vacated and restored [the tract] to the public 
domain ... ," and "open [ ed] ... [it] ... to settle-
merit .... " The second statute came 14 years later, the 
Act of June 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 325, 337-338. That statute 
in terms "carr[ied] into effect the Agreement," and 
authorized the appropriation of the $1,500,000. Pay-
ment of the $1,500,000 was effected by five subsequ~nt 
enactments from 1907 to 1911, each of which appropri-
ated $300,000 .and recited that it wa.s part payment "to 
the Indians on the Colville Reservation, Washington, for 
the cession of land opened to settlement by the Act of 
July first, eighteen hundred and ninety-two ... being a 
part of the full sum set aside and held in the Treasury 
of the United States in payment for said land under the 
terms of the Act of June first, nineteen hundred and six, 
ratifying the agreement ceding said land to the United 
States under date of May ninth, eighteen hundred and 
ninety-one .... " (Emphasis supplied.) 34 Stat. 1015, 
1050-1051 (.1907); 35 Stat. 70, 96 (1908); 35 Stat. 781, 
813 (1909); 36 Stat. 269, 286 ( 1910); 36 Stat. 1058, 1075 
(1911).6 
6 The delay in approval was occasioned by the initial reluctance 
of the House to ratify the Agreement without certain changes, 23 
Cong. Rec. 3840, and by doubts raised in the Senate whether the 
Indians had title to the reservation, since it was created by Executive 
Order. See S. Rep. No. 664, 52d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2. The 
Interior Department reported some yearn later that. tho doubts were 
unfounded. S. Rep. No. 2651, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., 137, 139. A 
House bill passed in 1891 replaced the $1,500,000 lump sum with 
a payment of $1 .25 per acre, to be paid to the credit of the Indians 
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II 
Although admitted to statehood two years earlier, the 
State of Washington was not a pa.rty to the 1891 Agree-
ment. The opinion of the State Supreme Court relies 
upon that fact to attempt a distinction for purposes of 
the Supremacy Clause 7 between the binding result upon 
agreed, however, and passed the Senate Bill that became the Act of 
July 1, 1892. That Act makes no mention either of the considera-
tion to be paid, or of the hunting and fishing rights preserved . 
Many protests were registered that Congress had failed to live up 
to the terms of the Agreement. These included protests from the 
Department of the Interior, S. Rep. No. 2561, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., 
137, 139, and from Chairman Fullerton, who had become Chief 
Justice of t.he Supreme Court of Wa~hington. In a letter, S. Rep. 
No. 2561, supra, p. 40, the Chief Justice said: 
"It may be that my relations to this transaction have somewhat 
warped my judgment, but when I recall the impassioned appeals 
made by some of the aged members of these remnant bands, calling 
upon their people and upon the heads of the tribes not to sign away 
their lands, even though the compensation offered was ample, on 
the ground that it was their last heritage and their last tie on 
earth, I cannot help a feeling of bitterness when I remember that 
the Government, whom we represented to them as being just and 
honorable, took away their land without even the solace of 
compensation ." 
These protests and many others finally bore fruit and resulted in 
Congress' enactment of the Act of June 21, 1906, and the five sub-
sequent installment acts. The Colville retained some 16 lawyers 
practicing in the States of Washington, Pennsyvlania, and Georgia, 
and the District of Columbia, who recovered judgments for their 
services in the Court of Claims. Butler and Vale v. United States, 
43 Ct. Cl. 497 (1908). 
7 Article VI, cl. 2, of the Constitution, the Supremacy Clause, 
provides: 
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State 
\o the- Comtrary notwithstanding." 
. .. ., 
.. 
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the State of ratification of a contract by treaty effected 
by concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, Art. II, § 2, 
cl. 2, and the binding result of ratification of a contract 
effected by legislation passed by the House and the 
Senate. The opinion states that "once ratified, a treaty 
becomes the supreme law of the land," but the ratified 
1891 Agreement was a mere contract enforceable "only 
against those party to it," and "not a treaty ... [and] ... 
not the supreme law of the land." 82 Wn. 2d 444, 511 
P. 2d 1354. The grounds for this attempted distinction 
do not clearly emerge from the opinion. The opinion 
states, however, "[t]he statutes enacted by Congress in 
implementation of this [1891] agreement ... are the 
supreme law if they are within the power of Congress to 
enact .... " 82 Wn. 2d 451, 511 P. 2d 1358. In the 
context of the discussion in the opinion we take this to 
mean that the Congress is not constitutionally em-
powered to inhibit a State's exercise of its police power 
by legislation ratifying a contract between the Executive 
Branch and an Indian tribe to which the State is not a 
party. The fallacy in that proposition is that a legislated 
ratification of an agreement between the Executive 
Branch and an Indian tribe is a "Law of the United' 
States made in Pursuance" of the Constitution and, there-
fore, like "all Treaties made," is made binding upon 
affected States by the Supremacy Clause. 
The opinion seems to find support for the attempted 
distinction in the fact that the Executive Branch was 
not authorized to contract by treaty with Indian tribes 
in 1891. 82 Wn. 2d 444, 511 P. 2d 1354. Twenty years 
earlier, in 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566, Congress had abrogated 
the contract by treaty method of dealing with Indian 
tribes.8 The Act of 1871 resulted from the o'pposition 
8 The Act of Marcl1 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566, 25 U. S. C. § 71 
provided : 
<'No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United 
73-717-0PINION 
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of the House of Representatives to its practical exclusion 
from any policy role in Indian affairs. For nearly a 
century the Executive Branch made treaty arrangements 
with the Indians "by and with the Advice and Consent 
of the Senate," Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Although the House 
appropriated money to carry out these treaties, it had no 
voice in the development of substantive Indian policy 
reflected in them. House resentment first resulted in 
legislation in 1867 repealing "all laws allowing the Presi-
dent, the Secretary of the Interior, or the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs to enter into treaties with any Indian 
tribes," Act of March 28, 1867, 15 Stat. 7, 9, but this was 
repealed a few months later, Act of July 20, 1867, 15 Stat. 
18. There were further unsuccessful House attempts to 
enter the field of federal Indian policy, and ultimately 
the House refused to grant funds to carry out new 
treaties. United States Department of the Interior, 
Federal Indian Law, 1958, at 211. Finally, the Senate 
capitulated and joined the House in passage of the 1871 
Act as a rider to the Indian Appropriation Act of 1871. 
Federal Indian Law, supra, at 138.9 
State;; shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, 
tribe. or power with whom the United States may contract by 
treaty; but no obligation of any treaty lawfully made and ra.tified 
with such Indian nation or tnbe 11rior to March third, eighteen hun-
dred and seventy-one, ::;hall be hereby invalidated or impaired." 
9 Former Commissioner of Indian Affairs Walker summarized the 
struggle as follows: 
''In 1871, however, the insolence of conscious strength, and the 
growing jealousy of the House of Reprebentatives towards the pre-
rogative-arrogated by the Senate-of determming, in connection 
with the executive. all questions of Indian r1ght and title, and of 
committing the United States incidentally to pecuniary obligations 
limited only by its own d1scretwn, for wh1ch the House should be 
bound to make prov1sion w1thout mquiry, led to the adoption, after 
l:leveral severe parhamentary struggles of the declaration . . that 
hereafter 'no Indian nation or tnbc within the terntory of the 
United States &hall be acknowledged or recogmzed as an independent 
73 717-0PINION 
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This abrogation of the cont,ract by treaty method 
meant no more than that after 1871 relati,ons with 
Indians would be governed by Acts of Congress rather 
than by treaty. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94 (1884); 
In re Heff, 197 U. S. 488 (1905). But abrogation of the 
contract by treaty method in no way affected Congress' 
power to legisla-te on problems of Indians, including legis-
lating the ratification of contracts of the Executive 
Branch with Indian tribes to which affected States were 
not parties. Several decisions of this Court settled that 
proposition. lt1 Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665 (1912), 
the Court held that tax exernptions contained in an 1897 
agreement ratified by Congress between the United 
States and Indian tribes as part of a cession of Indian 
lands were enforceable against the State of Oklahoma, 
which was not a party to the agreement. In Perri'n v. 
United States, 232 U. S. 78 (1914). the Court enforced 
a clause of an agreement ratified by Act of Congress that 
no intoxicating liquor should be sold on land in South Da-
kota ceded and relinquished to the United States, although 
South Dakota was not a party to the agreement. The 
Court expressly rejected the contention that the power 
to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors upon all ceded 
lands rested exclusively in the State. Rather, because 
Congress was empowered, when securing the cession of 
part of an Indian reservation within a State, to prohibit 
the sale of intoxicants upon the ceded lands, "it follows 
that the State possesses no exclusive control over the 
subject and that the congressional prohibition is su-
preme." 232 U. S .. at 483. See also Dick v. United 
States, 208 U.S. 340 (1908). These decisions sustained 
the ratified agreements as the exercise by Congress of 
its "plenary power ... to deal with the special problems 
nation, tribe, or power, with whom the United States may contract 
by treaty'" Federal Indian Law, supra, at 211-212, citing- Walker, 
The Indian Question, 1874. 
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of Indians [that] is drawn both explicitly and implicitly 
from the Constitution itself. Article I, § 8, cl. 3, pro-
vides Congress with the power to regulate commerce ... 
with the Indian Tribes and thus, to this extent, singles 
Indians out as a proper subject for separate legislation." 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551-552 (1974); see 
also Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U. S. 199, 236 (1974). 
Once ratified by Act of Congress, the provisions of the 
agreements become law, and like treaties, are the supreme 
law of the land. In the absence of any contract between 
the Executive Branch and the Colville Confederated 
Tribes, Congress could constitutionally have terminated 
the northern half of the Colville Indian Reservation on 
the same terms and conditions that ultimately appeared 
in the 1891 Agreement. Maatz v. Arnett, 412 U. S. 481 
(1973). The decisions in Choate, Perrin, and Dick, 
supra, settle that Congress was also constitutionally em-
powered to do so by legislation ratifying the 1891 Agree-
ment. The legislative ratification constituted the pro-
visions of the 1891 Agreement, including Art. 6, "Laws 
of the United States ... in Pursuance" of the Constitu-
tion, and the supreme law of the land, just as a contract 
by treaty to the same effect, concurred in by the Senate, 
would have been a treaty binding upon the State. "Con-
gress has power to regulate commerce with the Indian 
tribes, and such power is superior and paramount to the 
authority of any State within whose limits are Indian 
tribes." Dick v. United States, supra, 208 U.S., at 353.w 
10 WRC 37.12.060, which assumes limited jurisdiction over Indians, 
expressly providi"S that the law shall not deprive any Indian of 
rights secured by agreement. 
"Nothmg in th1s chapter . . . shall deprive any Indian or any Indian 
tnbe, band, community of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded 
under federal treaty, agreement, statute, or Executive Order with 
respect to Indian land grants, hunting trapping, or fishing or the 
control, licensing, or regulation thereof." (Emphasis added.) 
T 
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III 
The opm10n of the State Supreme Court also holds 
that in any event the implementing statutes cannot be 
construed to render RCW 77.16.020 and RCW 77.16.030 
inapplicable to Indian beneficiaries of the Agreement 
since the implementing statutes "make no reference to 
the provision [Article 6] relied upon by the appellants." 
82 Wn. 2d 451, 511 P. 2d 1358. The opinion reasons, 
"if it was thought that state regulation but not federal 
regulation would constitute an abridgement, an express 
provision to that effect should have been inserted, but 
only after the consent of the state had been sought and 
obtained." 82 Wn. 2d 448, 511 P. 2d 1357. This 
reasoning is fatally flawed. The proper inquiry is not 
whether the State was or should have been a consenting 
party to the 1891 Agreement, but whether appellants 
acquired federally guaranteed rights by congressional 
ratification of the Agreement. Plainly appellants ac-
quired such rights. Congress exercised its plenary con-
stitutional powers to legislate those federally protected 
rights into law in enacting the implementing statutes 
that ratified the Agreement. State qualification of the 
rights is therefore precluded by force of the Supremacy 
Clause, and neither an express provision precluding state 
qualifica.tion nor the consent of the Sta.te was required. 
On the contrary, if Congress had meant to subject to 
state regulation the preserved rights to hunt and fishr 
this Court would require that such intent explicitly 
appear on the face of the statutes or in their legislative 
history. "A congressional determination to terminate 
[a reservation] must be expressed on the face of the Act 
or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legis-
lative history." Maatz v. Arnett, supra, 412 U. S., at 
505. Since the Colville Indians rights to hunt and fish 
on the ceded northern half of the Colville Reservation 
73-717-0PINION 
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are part of their larger rights in that ceded half, see 
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968),11 
we hold that a congressional determination to subject 
those rights to qualification by state regulation must 
similarly "be expressed on the face of the statutes or be 
clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative 
history." 
But no congressional purpose to subject the preserved 
rights to such state regulation is to be found in 
either the implementing acts or their legislative history. 
Rather, the implementing statutes unqualifiedly, "car-
r[ied] into effect" and "ratif[ied]" the explicit and 
unqualified provision of Art. 6 that "the right to hunt 
and fish . shall not be taken away or in anywise 
abridged." 
IV 
Fina.lly, the opinion of the State Supreme Court con-
strues Art. 6 as merely a promise by the United States 
that so long as it retained any ceded land and allowed 
others to hunt thereon, Indians would be allowed also to 
hunt there. 82 Wn. 2d, at 449-450, 511 P. 2d, at 1357-
1358. But the provision of Art. 6 that the preserved rights 
are not exclusive and are to be enjoyed "in common with 
all other persons," does not support that interpretation or 
affect the Supremacy Clause's preclusion of qualifying 
11 Even without an express provision preserving hunting and fish-
ing right8, M onominee agreed that those rights are "part of the larger 
rights possessed by the Indians in the lands used and occupied by 
them," Federal Indian Law, supra, at 497, citing Op. Act . Sol. M. 
28107, and ~urv1ve the termination of the reservation. Thus, there is 
no merit in the State's argument that the termination of the northern 
half of the Reservation by the 1892 Act without mention of Art. 6 
or any other specific preservation of hunting and fishing rights left 
the State free to regulate the Indians' exercise of those rights . But 
in any event the 1892 Act was only one of the series of statutes 
Congress passed to ratify the 1891 Agreement, including Art. 6. 
73-717-0PINION 
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state regulation. Non-Indians are, of course, not bene~ 
ficiaries of the preserved rights and the State remains 
wholly free to prohibit or regulate non-Indian hunting 
and fishing. 'fhe ratifying legislation must be construed 
to exempt the Indians' preserved rights from like state 
regulation, however, else Congress preserved nothing 
which the Indians would not have had without that legis-
lation. For it is impermissible in the absence of explicit 
congressional expression, to construe the implementing 
acts as "an impotent outcome to negotiations and a con-
vention, which seemed to promise more and give the word 
of the nation for more." United States v. Winans, 198 
U.S. 371, 380 (1905); Puyallup Tribe v. Department of 
Game (Puyallup I), 391 U. S. 392, 397-398 (1968). 
Winans involved a treaty that reserved to the Indians 
in the area ceded to the United States "the right of taking 
fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common with 
citizens of the Territory." 198 U. S., supra, at 378. 
Puyallup considered a provision that "[t]he right of tak-
ing fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, 
is further secured to said Indians, in common with all 
citizens of the Territory .... " 391 U. S., supra, at 395. 
The Court held that rights so preserved "may, of course, 
not be qualified by the State .... " 391 U. S., supra, 
at 398; 198 U. S., supra, at 384. Article 6 presents an 
even stronger case since Congress' ratification of it in-
cluded the flat prohibition that the right "shall not be 
taken away or in anywise abridged." 
The canon of construction tha.t this Court has applied 
over a century is that the wording of treaties and agree-
ments with the Indians are not to be construed to their 
prejudice. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U. S. (6 Pet.) 515 
(1832). See also The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 
737, 760 (1866); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 
(1886); Chnctaw Nations v. United States, 119 U. S. 1, 
,., 
. 
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28 (1886); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-
381 (1905); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912); 
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U. S. 404, 406 n. 
2 (1968). That caqon furthers discharge of "the dis-
tinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Govern-
ment in its dealing with these dependent and sometimes 
exploited people," Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 
U.S. 286, 296 (1942); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S., supra, 
at 236. We have no reason in this case, however, to in-
voke that canon of construction. The clarity and com-
plete absence of ambiguity in the wording of Art. 6 makes 
resort to the canon wholly unnecessary. 
v 
In Puyallup Tribe v. United States, .~upra, 391 U. S., 
at 398, we held that a.lthough, these rights "may ... not 
be qualified by the State, ... the manner of fishing [and 
hunting], the size of the take, the restriction of COlflmer-
cial fishing [and hunting] and the like may be regulated 
by the State in the interest of conservation, provided the 
regulation meets appropriate standards and does not 
discriminate against the Indiaps." 391 U. S., supra, at 
398. The "appropriate standards" requirement means 
that the State must demonstrate that its regulation is a 
reasonable and necessary conservation measure, Depart-
ment of Game v. Puyall1tp Tribe, 414 U. S. 44 (1973); 
Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942), and that 
its application to the Indians is necessary in the interest 
of conservation. 
The United States as amicus curiae, invites the Court 
to announce that state restrictions "cannot abridge the 
Indians' federally protected rights without [the State] 
demonstrating a compelling need" in the interest of con-
servation. Brief of the United States as amicus curiae, 
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this question. The State of Washington has not argued, 
let alone established, that applying the ban on out-of-
season hunting of deer by the Indians on the land in 
question is in any way necessary or even useful for the 
conservation of deer. See Hunt v. United States, 278 
u.s. 96 (1928).12 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of 
Washington sustaining appellants' convictions is re-
versed and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
12 Appellants apparently claim no right to hunt on fenced private· 
property. The State Supreme Court stated: 
"Counsel . . . conceded in oral argument that the present owners; 
of land in the northern half of the reservation ha.ve the right ta 
fence their lamd and exclude hunters. Nevertheless they maintain 
that state regulation of the right to hunt is an abridgement of that 
right . . . . " 82 Wn. 2d 448., 511 P. 2d 1356. 
A claim of entitlement to hunt on fenced or posted private land \ 
without prior prrmission of the owner would raise serious questions. 
not presented in this case .. 
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February 10, 1975 
Re: No. 73-717, Antoine v. Washington 
Dear Bill, 
Please add my name to your dissent-
ing opinion in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
,-; (i . 
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.in.prnnt <!fonrl ttf tqt ~ h ~fafts­
~agfrittghtn. ~. <!f. 211p'!~ 
CHAMBERS OF' 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
February 14, 1975 
Re: 73-717 -Antoine v. Washington 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your opinion. 
L
/ Regards:_ 
j r? I\. 
j ~· I • . ,, r r..J 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
( 
THE C. J. W. 0. D. W. J. B. P. S. B. R. W. T. M. H . A. B. L. F. P. W. H. R. 
12/23/74 
~ tVlb ~ ~~~ ~ ~IA)6 ~0J8 J~ ~t.J~{j w~u 
2- \~ .. 1S ~- 13.-/) \-1 S" -7 wttR. \- ~~-7 S" I -I ~-/.5 ul-1~ ~4G~ 
~~~ ~,to- ?S 
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